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Abstract 
We investigate experimentally the relationship between risk and incentives in a Principal-
Agent setting. In contrast to the existing empirical literature that describes such 
relationship as ‘tenuous’ or inconclusive, we find a clear negative relationship – 
supporting the prediction of the standard theoretical model. Specifically, we find that 
principals reduce the size of the offered piece-rates with an increase in risk; and instead 
provide positive fixed wages. Furthermore, we find no relationship between the variance 
in the performance and the effort choice of the agent, and a strong positive relationship 
between the effort choice of the agents and the offered piece-rates as well as fixed wage, 
suggesting positive reciprocity. Finally, we find evidence of social projection by the 
principals regarding the agents’ degree of risk aversion.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the most celebrated results in personnel and organizational economics is on the 
optimal incentive intensity of employment contracts (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). A key 
tenet of this study is that in markets where employees’ efforts are unobservable and outputs are 
subject to high volatility due to idiosyncratic market factors, the use of performance measures 
that are tied to outputs should be less common than in markets exhibiting less volatility and 
more stable performance. This is because, as agents are risk-averse, they will be less willing to 
accept contracts that tie their earnings to stochastic factors beyond their control. Consequently, 
the greater the risk associated with the environment, the lower the incentive intensity or 
performance pay of the employment contract. In the literature, this is often termed as the 
Incentive Intensity Principle (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
Despite the clear intuition of the model, the empirical evidence on the relationship 
between riskiness in the environment and the incentive intensity of payment schemes have been 
rather mixed, casting doubts on the validity of the model. Prendergrast (2002) reports the 
findings from twenty-six empirical studies, out of which only four find evidence for a negative 
relationship, as predicted in the theory. This dearth of empirical support has led to the 
proliferation of new theoretical models that attempt to explain why a negative relationship may 
not be observed in the field. For instance, Prendergast (2002) argues that the delegation of 
principal’s authority to an agent can explain the evidence for a positive relationship between 
incentive intensity and performance measure. Similarly, Budde and Krakel (2011) show that 
combining risk aversion to limited liability could account for such a positive relationship. 
Likewise, Wright (2004) demonstrates that when one accounts for heterogeneous managers 
differing in their degrees of risk aversion, both negative and positive relationships are plausible.  
In this paper we present a controlled laboratory experiment that tests the relationship 
between incentive intensity and risk while, isolating any alternative explanations. Testing this 
relationship in the lab has two significant advantages: first, it provides enhanced control, which 
allows implementing precise values of the parameters of the model (Charness and Kuhn, 2011; 
Camerer and Weber, 2013); second, it allows ruling out alternative explanations (such as the 
ones discussed earlier) of why the relationship observed using field data is weak or non-existent 
(Charness and Kuhn, 2011; Corgnet and Hernan-Gonzalez, 2018).  
To the best of our knowledge, this is only the second experimental study that tests the 
relationship between incentive intensity and risk. Very recently Corgnet and Hernan-Gonzalez 
(2018), henceforth C-HG, report an experiment that independently tests the trade-off between 
 3 
 
risk and incentives. Our experimental design shares various similarities and some crucial 
divergences with that of C-HG. Similar to them we conduct between-subject treatments, in 
which output is either deterministic (baseline treatment) or stochastic (risk treatments). In one 
of our risk treatments, as in C-HG, we insure the principal towards the stochastic element to 
ensure his risk neutrality. But, as a robustness test, we additionally conduct another risk 
treatment where the principal is not insured towards risk, allowing for both the principal and 
the agent to be risk averse. Furthermore, like C-HG, we have collected data on risk aversion 
for both principals and agents using the Holt and Laury (2002) task. But, whereas C-HG elicit 
the beliefs of principals on agents’ risk aversion, we rely on social projection (Robbins and 
Krueger, 2005). The key difference between our designs and that of C-HG’s, however, is the 
way the agents exert effort in a Principal-Agent setting. In both the studies the principal offers 
a linear contract to the agent that consists of a fixed wage, and a share on agent’s production. 
However, whereas C-HG employ a real-effort summation task to simulate the agent’s effort 
choice, we follow the tradition in the gift exchange literature (Fehr et al. 1998; Anderhub et al., 
2002; Fehr and Gaechter, 2002, Fehr and Schmidt, 2004; Fehr et al. 2007) in which the agent 
states/chooses an effort level subject to a (convex) cost of effort function. 
As with every design choice there are certain advantages and disadvantages of using a 
stated-effort versus a real-effort task.1 A real-effort task is a more intuitive approach closer to 
the field. However, an underpinning assumption of the Incentive Intensity Principle (henceforth 
IIP) is that principals (and agents) are aware of the precise cost of the effort function the agent 
is subjected to. Using a real effort task introduces heterogeneity in the cost of effort and requires 
the principal to rely on his beliefs regarding the agent’s ability to complete the task. In essence, 
introducing a real effort task transforms the moral hazard problem into a combined problem of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. As shown in C-HG, this may not affect the direction of the 
predictions of the IIP; but it complicates the analysis of the contract of the principal. Also, in 
the presence of asymmetric information regarding the agent’s ability, the principal’s optimal 
contract does not implement the efficient level of effort even in the absence of noise. 
Additionally, also noted by C-HG, it could be argued that the baseline treatment is not strictly 
deterministic, since the agents may find the solution to the task by luck, and/or the agents may 
not know their ability of the task with certainty. Using a stated-effort rather than a real-effort 
task eliminates these informational issues and brings the experiment closer to theory, though it 
does not come without limitations. As shown in Charness et al. (2004), stated effort in gift 
                                                     
1 See Charness et al. (2018) for a recent discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches. 
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exchange games is sensitive to the way payoffs are presented to the subjects. In particular, they 
show that providing a payoff table reduces average wages by 19% and discretionary effort by 
69%. Even though we do not provide agents with an explicit payoff table, we provided 
calculators that allowed estimating the potential profits for given effort levels and stochastic 
random factor outcomes. Nevertheless, since we are interested in treatment effects, we expect 
such issues not to affect our results.  
According to the linear agency model, the optimal effort choice of the agent depends 
on the marginal cost of effort and is unrelated to the noise in the performance measure. Sloof 
and van Praag (2008) test this experimentally and compare their results with expectancy theory, 
a theory developed by psychologists that predicts a negative relationship between effort and 
noise in the performance measure. In contrast to the current study that focuses on the optimal 
choice of incentive intensity, Sloof and van Praag (2008) focus on the optimal effort choice in 
a real effort (number adding) task with noise. Due to their divergent aim and to reduce 
complexity, they abstract away from the role of a principal and the subjects had to allocate 
effort between two different tasks. Their findings are in line with the linear agency model as 
their results suggest that effort levels are invariant to the distribution of noise terms. 
Overall, our results are broadly in support of the theoretical predictions of the IIP.  We 
find a negative relationship between incentive intensity and risk, in line with theoretical 
predictions and the findings of C-HG. The principals, on average, offer lower piece rates and 
higher fixed wages in the risk treatments than in the no risk treatment. However, in contrast to 
both C-HG and Sloof and van Praag (2008, 2010) who observe an increase in effort with higher 
risk; we find, again in line with the predictions of Hart and Holmström (1986), that agents 
respond with lower effort levels when the performance measure is noisier. The most plausible 
explanation for this difference in effort responses could be the fact that we used a stated-effort 
approach rather than a real-effort task. Lastly, in line with C-HG and Sloof and van Praag 
(2008, 2010) we find that the effort choices of the employees are not affected by the volatility 
in the performance measure in contrast to the expectancy theory of motivation (Vroom, 1964). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework under the parametric restrictions in the experiment, and Section 3 describes the 
specifics of the experimental design. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
The instructions as well as proofs of the theoretical predictions are provided in the Appendix. 
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2. The Principal-Agent Model  
In this section we construct a Principal-Agent model following Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987) and describe the theoretical solutions. First, we consider the case where there 
is no stochastic variance on output, and therefore effort is observable (but not contractible). 
Second, we consider the case where output is the sum of effort and a stochastic random factor. 
Here the principal cannot distinguish which part of the output is due to the agent’s effort and 
which part is due to the stochastic random factor.  
With no risk, the revenue (𝑅) depends on the agent’s effort level 𝑒 such that 𝑅(𝑒) =
50𝑒. The agent starts with an endowment of effort; s/he bears an effort cost of 𝐶(𝑒) = 𝑒2 with 
𝑒 ∈ {5,6, … ,10}. The principal also holds an endowment and s/he jointly decides on a fixed 
wage 𝐹 ∈ {50, 51, … ,200} and a piece rate 𝛽 ∈ {5, 6, … ,40} that specifies how much 
Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) the agent will receive for each unit of effort.2 Hence, the 
agent’s payoff is given by: 
P𝐴 = F + 𝛽𝑒 − 𝐶(𝑒) +  𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡. 
Conversely, the principal’s payoff is: 
PP = R(e) − F − 𝛽𝑒 + 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡. 
Assuming that both principal and the agent are payoff maximizers, the game theoretic 
solution, derived in Appendix A for the specific parameters used in the experiment, predicts 
the principal to offer a piece rate of 20 and a fixed wage of 50 and the agent to exert an effort 
level of 10.  The consequent payoff, after taking into account their endowments, for the 
principal is 𝑃𝑃 = 450 and for the agent is 𝑃𝐴 = 350.  
With risk in the environment, the piece rate in output is subject to a stochastic variance 
(𝑉), which is normally distributed with a mean of zero. When we make the standard assumption 
that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse, then the principal faces a trade-off 
between incentivizing the agent, and providing him with insurance for the variance in payoffs 
that is created due to the stochastic random factor. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown 
that the optimal incentive intensity (i.e., piece rate) is given by: 
𝛽∗ = 𝑅′(𝑒)/[1 + 𝑟𝑉𝐶′′(𝑒)]. 
where 𝑟 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ARA) of the agent. Given that 𝑉 in our 
experiment was set at 2.5 and the rest of the factors remained unchanged, the optimal 𝛽∗ is: 
                                                     
2 Note that in our model, accepting the contract implied a minimum effort of 5. The compensation an employee 
received for an effort of 5 was 75 ECU split between a fixed wage of 50 ECU and a piece rate of 5 ECU per unit.  
 6 
 
𝛽∗ = 50/(1 + 5𝑟). 
We elicited the coefficient of ARA for all subjects by using the Holt and Laury (2002) 
questionnaire. Note that the model assumes that the principal is aware of the exact value of the 
coefficient of ARA for each agent. Hence, in order to generate a benchmark, we calculated an 
average ?̅? from all subjects in our experiment. The average coefficient of ARA from all subject 
participants was  ?̅? = 0.549. After inserting ?̅? in Eq. 15 in Appendix A, it yields the optimal 
𝛽∗= 13.35. With optimal incentive intensity determined it is easy to show that the optimal effort 
level for the employee is 7 while the optimal fixed wage remains unchanged at 50 ECU. 
However, as the participants in our subject pool could select only one decimal, the optimal 
choice for an employer is 𝛽∗=13.4. Consequently the expected profits (including endowments) 
for the principal and the agent respectively are: 𝑃𝑃 = 516 and  𝑃𝐴 = 384. 
3. Experimental Design  
The experiment was conducted at the University of East Anglia in Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007) with 360 student participants of a variety of backgrounds. The experiment employed a 
fictional currency, ECU, which was converted to Great Britain Pounds at the end of the 
experiment at the rate of £0.02 per ECU. Each session lasted approximately 80 minutes and 
the subjects earned on average £9.60, including a show-up fee of £2.00.  
Each session consisted of 10 rounds, the first three rounds were practice rounds. At the 
end of the 10 rounds the subjects had to complete the Holt and Laury (2002) risk elicitation 
questionnaire. After the completion of the questionnaire the subjects had to complete two non-
incentivized psychology questionnaires (Blais and Weber, 2006) that measures risk taking and 
risk perception. As the first three rounds acted as practice rounds, in the end of the experiment 
one of the remaining seven rounds was chosen randomly and was paid privately and 
anonymously to the subjects in cash, along with any additional earnings from the Holt and 
Laury (2002) task. A random matching procedure was implemented at the start of each round 
to control for reputation effects.  A positive frame of employer/employee was adopted instead 
of an abstract frame, as context can be useful to enhance understanding (Cooper and Kagel 
2003, 2009) in an organizational setting. In addition, both the employer/employee frame (e.g., 
Fehr et al. 1998, Karakostas et al. 2017) and the buyer/ seller frame (e.g., Fehr and Gachter 
2002, and Fehr et al. 2007) have been previously used in the context of the gift exchange 
finding no qualitative differences between the frames.  
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The experiment had three treatments: No Risk (NR), Risk (R), and Both in Risk (BR). 
We ran 30 sessions in total (10 sessions per treatment) with 12 subjects in each session. The 
subjects were split evenly as employers or employees and maintained the same role throughout 
the experiment. The instructions were common for both employers and employees. After the 
subjects had read the instructions, they had to answer control questions to ensure that they 
properly understood the instructions. If a subject provided a wrong answer in any question, a 
detailed explanation appeared in his/ her computer screen. All three treatments were identical 
in every aspect apart from how risk affected the profit functions of the employers and 
employees.  
In the NR treatment the employer had to offer an employment contract to the employee 
requesting him or her to exert a level of effort. In the employment contract, the employer 
specified the size of the fixed wage, piece rate and a suggested effort level. The fixed wage 
could range between 50 and 200, the piece rate between 5 and 40, and the suggested effort level 
between 5 and 10.3 Then, the employee had to decide whether to accept or reject the contract 
offer. If the contract was rejected, the round finished and both subjects earned only their 
endowments (200 ECU). If the employee accepted the contract, then s/he had to decide an 
effort level between 5 and 10. Recall that exerting effort was costly and the cost of effort was 
given by the function 𝐶(𝑒)  = 𝑒2. The total revenue for the employer was given by 𝑇𝑅 = 50𝑒. 
After the agent decided an effort level, experimental payoffs were given by:  
𝜋𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟 = 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 50𝑒 − [𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 + (𝑃𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑒] 
𝜋𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 = 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 + (𝑃𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑒 − 𝐶(𝑒) 
In the R treatment the profit function of the employee was altered to incorporate the 
risk associated with the incentive measure (the piece rate). According to the theory, the random 
factor is assumed to generate noise in the performance measure not allowing the principal to 
directly observe the effort choice of the agent.4 Given that the principal is assumed to be risk 
neutral and the random factor is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero, s/he 
will not be affected by the associated risk in the total revenue or on its impact on the piece rate. 
The main concern for the principal is whether the risk dilutes the incentives generated by the 
                                                     
3 In order to ensure that no subject made any losses due to the variance of the random factor, we decided that there 
would be a minimum effort level and consequently a minimum wage – which is prevalent in the field. To avoid 
creating any potential cues regarding which payment mechanism the employer should use, we split the minimum 
wage equally between the fixed wage and piece rate. 
4 The random factor was presented to the subjects in the form of a table in which each possible value that 𝑥 could 
take was assigned a respective probability. The table is included in the instructions in Appendix B.  
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piece rate for the risk averse agent. Although the principal is assumed to be risk neutral as s/he 
is able to diversify the associated risk; given that s/he is assigned only one agent, this 
assumption may not be justifiable. To overcome this problem and to ensure the principal can 
indeed act as risk neutral, the risk component was removed from his or her profit function. 
Hence, the experimenter acts as an insurer for the principal allowing the principal to act as if 
s/he was risk neutral. This allows us to rule out any effects from the principal being risk averse, 
which could deviate from a key assumption of the theoretical model.  Therefore, the profit 
function of the employer was held unchanged; whereas the piece rate that was paid to the agent 
was formulated by the sum of the effort and the random factor (𝑥).  
𝜋𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟 = 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 50𝑒 − [𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 + (𝑃𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑒] 
𝜋𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 = 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 + (𝑃𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑒 + 𝑥) − 𝐶(𝑒) 
Finally, although not directly related to our research question, we ran the BR treatment 
as a robustness check to test whether imposing risk neutrality to the principal in the R treatment 
has an effect in his/ her behavior. Hence, in this treatment the profit function of the agent 
remained the same as in the R treatment, but the principal was also subject to risk.  
  𝜋𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟 = 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 50(𝑒 + 𝑥) − [𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 + (𝑃𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑒 + 𝑥)] 
𝜋𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 = 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 + (𝑃𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑒 + 𝑥) − 𝐶(𝑒) 
If the imposition of risk neutrality in the R treatment indeed has no effect on principal 
behavior, then one would expect (statistically) similar outcomes in the R and the BR treatment. 
However, if there is a difference in the outcomes, then the risk neutrality assumption for the 
principal will turn out to be a crucial one. 
 
Table 1: Theoretical Predictions 
 Fixed wage Piece rate Effort 
NR 50 20 10 
R 50 13.35 7 
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Table 1 summarizes the theoretical predictions for the fixed wage, piece rate and effort 
for the R and NR treatments. The model suggests that the optimal piece rate 𝛽 will be 20 in the 
NR and 13.35 in the R treatment (Appendix B), since the employer partially insures the 
employee. Hence, following the theoretical predictions, we can coin the following hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: The piece rate is lower in the R treatment than in the NR treatment. In particular, 
the piece rate offered by the principals in the NR and R treatments are equal to 13.4 ECU5 and 
20 ECU respectively.6 
The agent’s effort level is expected to depend only on the piece rate offered by the 
principal (and not on the fixed wage or the noise in the performance measure) as it formulates 
the incentive constraint of the agent. 
Hypothesis 2: Effort level depends solely to the piece rate the principal offers to the agent. 
The fixed wage level and the noise in the performance measure have no influence on the effort 
level chosen by the agent. 
Note that theoretically the principal is assumed to know the coefficient of ARA of the 
agent in order to determine the optimal piece rate in the R treatment. Although we had 
examined the possibility of obtaining the coefficient of risk aversion of the agents in advance 
and provide it to the principals, we believe that this information would be very difficult to be 
interpreted. Therefore, we relied on the concept of social projection (Orbell and Dawes, 1991). 
According to the social projection theory, each player will project his own characteristics to 
others and use them as a cue on how they are more likely to behave (see Krueger (2007) for a 
review). If we assume that the principal will use social projection to infer how risk averse the 
agent they are matched with is, then we can formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The more risk averse the principal is, the more risk averse s/he expects the agent 
to be; and, as a result, the smaller the piece rate that s/he offers to the agent.  
4. Results  
In this section we first present the descriptive statistics, and the results of the session-
level two-tailed non-parametric tests on piece rates, fixed wages, and effort levels across the 
treatments. Then we continue with regression analyses with respect to the piece rates and effort.  
                                                     
5 The precise prediction of the model given our parameterization is 13.35. However, since only one decimal was 
allowed the profit maximising choice for the employee is 13.4. 
6 One should, however, take the quantitative predictions of our model with caution, as it relies on the estimated 
risk aversion parameter from the whole population. We thank a referee for pointing this out, 
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4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Non-Parametric Tests  
Table 2 summarizes the mean values of the aforementioned variables. When there is 
noise in the environment (R) employers’ offer on average a higher fixed wage and a lower 
piece rate than when there is no noise (NR). In addition, the effort level is smaller in the R 
treatment than in the NR treatment (and almost the same as in the BR treatment).7  
Table 2: Average fixed wages, piece rates, and efforts across treatments 
 Fixed wage Piece rate Effort 
NR 69.93 16.51 7.44 
R 72.75 14.41 6.94 
BR 78.94 15.38 7.00 
    
We conducted pair-wise Mann-Whitney tests for fixed wages, piece rates, and effort 
levels across the treatments. Table 3 provides a summary of the p-values of these tests. The 
variable is depicted on the horizontal axis, and the treatment comparison on the vertical axis. 
As can be seen, only the difference between piece rates in the R and the NR treatments are 
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p = 0.034). These are summarized in Result 1. 
Table 3: M-W tests for fixed wage, piece rate and effort accross treatments 
    Fixed wage        Piece rate Effort 
NR vs. R 0.762 0.034** 0.104 
R vs. BR 0.273 0.199 0.734 
NR vs. BR 0.131 0.325 0.161 
    
Note: All tests are two-tailed tests conducted at session level to control for non-independence of 
observations. The tests reported are for all offers, conducting the tests only on accepted offers 
leads to qualitatively similar results. 
 
Result 1: In line with Hypothesis 1, the piece rate is significantly lower in the R treatment than 
in the NR treatment. 
                                                     
7 Since the acceptance rates were very high in all the treatments (97.6% 96.6% and 96.9% in the NR, R and BR 
respectively), we do not provide any further analyses on acceptance rates. 
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Interestingly, the average piece rate that was offered by the principals in the R treatment 
was significantly larger than the piece rate predicted by the model (Mann-Whitney p = 0.023).  
Result 2: In contrast to Hypothesis 1, on average the piece rate offered in the R treatment was 
statistically significantly larger than the predicted piece rate of 13.4.  
Note, further, that the piece rates in the BR treatment is in between the piece rate in the 
R and the NR treatments; and it is not statistically different from either of the two. This can be 
interpreted as injecting risk to the principal does not significantly change behavior (BR vs. R). 
Table 4 provides a summary of the Spearman correlation tests for fixed wage, effort, 
and piece rate - for each treatment. By conducting Spearman correlation tests between the three 
variables above, we found (as expected) a very strong positive correlation between effort and 
piece rate. In addition, we observe a negative correlation between fixed wage and piece rate, 
implying that the employers use the two tools as substitutes to each other. Finally, we observe 
a weak negative correlation between the fixed wage and effort, in line with C-HG and Sloof 
and van Praag (2010). However, as we discuss in the following section, when we control for 
the impact of piece rates on effort in regression analyses, we observe a weak but positive 
relationship between effort and fixed wages, ceteris paribus. 
Table 4: Spearman correlation coeeficients for fixed wage, piece rate and effort  
All Treatments  Both Risk 
 Fixed wage Piece Rate   Fixed wage Piece Rate 
Fixed wage – –  Fixed wage – – 
Piece rate -0.380*** –  Piece rate -0.352*** – 
Effort -0.145*** 0.721***  Effort -0.126*** 0.720*** 
       
No Risk   Risk 
 Fixed wage Piece Rate   Fixed wage Piece Rate 
Fixed wage – –  Fixed wage – – 
Piece rate -0.473*** –  Piece rate -0.291*** – 
Effort -0.207*** 0.730***  Effort -0.074** 0.702*** 
 
Interestingly, we see that even though the correlations between piece rates and effort 
are quite stable across treatments, this is not true for the correlations for effort and fixed wages, 
and fixed wages and piece rates. Instead, we observe that employers treat fixed wages and piece 
rates as much weaker substitutes in NR than in R and BR (-0.291 relative to -0.473 and -0.352). 
This indicates that when the employees where not subject to risk, a piece rate seemed a 
relatively more attractive alternative to fixed wages.  
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4.2. Regression Analyses 
In this section we report the results of panel regressions with random effects with data 
from all the three treatments at the subject level and error-clustering at session level first for 
the piece rates (Table 4), and then for effort (Table 5).8 The regressions employ dummy 
variables for the experimental treatments, with the NR treatment as baseline. As three different 
measures of risk, (Holt and Laury (2002), risk taking, and risk perception) were collected, in 
each regression only one of them is used at a time. All three different measures of risk have 
been centered.9 In addition, relying on the literature on social projection, we use the 𝑟 
coefficient of the employer instead of the employee, assuming the employer would expect the 
employee to be as risk averse (or loving) as s/he is. Furthermore, we used interaction variables 
between each of the risk elicitation measures and the R treatment to capture any potential 
interaction effects between risk attitudes and the R treatment. Finally, we used dummy 
variables for nationality, gender, and economics students. We retained one observation per 
round for each subject, i.e., a total of 1223 observations.10   
[Table 4 about here] 
The results from the regressions on piece rate in Table 4 are in parallel with the findings 
of the non-parametric tests. In particular, in all the regressions that are presented in Table 4, 
the coefficient for the R treatment dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level: reinstating Result 1 that the higher the noise in the environment the smaller the piece rate 
offered by the employers.  
The coefficient for the control treatment (BR) dummy is not statistically significant: as 
found in the non-parametric tests. Moreover, post-regression tests suggest no statistically 
significant difference between the BR and R treatments: suggesting that our implementation of 
Principal’s risk neutrality worked as we hypothesized, and the result is robust.  
Result 3: There is no statistically significant difference between the average piece rate offered 
in the R treatment and the BR treatment.  
In regressions 2 to 4 on Table 4 we find that risk aversion has no impact on the size of 
the piece rate. However, after we introduced interaction variables between the risk treatment 
                                                     
8 We have also conducted hierarchical linear models and models with pair-wise treatment data (e.g., R vs. NR), 
and found qualitatively similar results.  
9 See Dalal and Zickar (2012) for a recent discussion on the advantages of centering. 
10 In one of the sessions due to a technical problem the choices of the subjects on the psychology questionnaires 
were not recorded, as a consequence in the regressions which employ the psychology questionnaires as a 
dependant variable there are 1218 observations as that session is omitted.  
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and each of the risk elicitation measures, we observe a statistically significant impact of the 
risk aversion coefficients both for the Holt and Laury (2002) task and the risk taking 
questionnaires. This provides our next result. 
Result 4: In line with Hypothesis 3, assuming social projection, the more risk averse the 
principal believes the agent is, the smaller the piece rate s/he offers. 
 Additionally, we find, as observed in Table 4, that the Principals view fixed wage and 
piece rate as substitutes. As a result, the coefficient for fixed wage is negative and statistically 
significant. The suggested effort is strongly correlated with the piece rate – indicating both an 
expectation of the principal and possibly his/her understanding of the convex cost function of 
the agents. The coefficients for the demographic controls are not significant except the British 
dummy, which is positive and weakly significant. This may possibly reflect the cultural / social 
differences (relatively costly labor, minimum wage restrictions etc.) of the British students 
relative to the international students.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Turning our attention to the regressions on the effort levels in Table 5, we observe that 
none of the treatment dummies have significant effect in the effort levels. This is in line both 
with the theory, and the findings of C-HG and Sloof and van Praag (2008). 
Result 5: In line with Hypothesis 2, the effort choices of the agents are not affected by the 
introduction of variance in the performance measure.  
We also find statistically significant positive coefficients for both the piece rate and the 
fixed wage. The first finding is in line with the model’s prediction and payoff maximizing 
behavior. However, significant positive coefficients for fixed wage contradicts with the 
standard theory, as well as the findings of C-HG and Sloof and van Praag (2008). Given that 
we have implemented a stated effort, this result could be explained through social preferences 
and/or reciprocal behavior (see, for e.g., Fehr et al. (1998)) of the agents.  These are 
summarized formally in the following results. 
Result 6: In line with Hypothesis 2, the agents responded with higher effort, the higher the 
piece rate offered by the principals.  
Result 7: In contrast to Hypothesis 2, the agents responded with higher effort the higher the 
fixed wage offered by the principals. 
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 None of the other explanatory variables and controls are significant. Implying that a 
suggested effort (given fixed wage and piece rate) does not affect the effort choice. 
Furthermore, demographic factors, e.g., nationality, gender do not affect the effort choice. 
5. Discussion 
An important theory in personnel economics, the Incentive Intensity Principle, states that 
as volatility in performance increases, performance driven contracts should be employed less. 
Empirical evaluation of this theory till date has provided mixed results. However, since field 
data may include confounding factors and lack controls, the results might not be free from 
noise. Laboratory experiments can eliminate such issues. In this study we investigate the 
relationship between risk and incentives through a Principal-Agent experiment.  
This is only the second experimental study in this area after C-HG, who implement a real 
effort task and find broad support for the theory. They explain some deviations in their findings 
with the canonical model with loss aversion. Our findings with respect to the relationship 
between risk and incentive intensity are in line with C-HG and provide further support for the 
predictions of the IIP. This also confirms the argument that the empirical studies, which found 
a positive or no relationship, may have been due to the variety of other confounding factors. 
Consequently, our findings provide support to theorists who introduced alternative dimensions 
or additional variables in order to explain the observed positive relationship in previous studies 
(e.g., Prendergast, 2002; Wright, 2004; Budde and Krakel, 2011). 
Supporting the model’s prediction, we find no relationship between the variance in the 
performance and the effort choice of the agent. Furthermore, we find a positive relationship 
between effort and the size of the piece rate offered (ceteris paribus), which is in line with the 
predictions of the model, and more generally with the assumption of payoff maximizing 
behavior found in the literature on incentive contracts (Anderhub et al., 2002; Corgnet and 
Hernán-González, 2018; Karakostas et al., 2017; Sloof and van Praag, 2010).  
Additionally, we observe that whereas the level of effort in NR is significantly lower than 
the value predicted by the theory, it is still higher than in treatment R. This result differs from 
Sloof and van Praag (2010) and C-HG who employ real effort tasks suggesting that a higher 
level of effort in a risky environment can be explained if agents are loss averse. Agents may 
exert a higher effort in order to increase the probability of being above their reference earnings 
level. However, this may not be possible when the (stated) effort, as in our setting, has a 
monetary cost. In this case, increasing the level of effort may not help to obtain higher earnings. 
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Hence, our result can shed light on how different tasks provide diverse results through different 
mechanisms. As this suggests that using stated rather than real effort may lead to deviations in 
effort choices, the impact of the two methods in behavior are worthy of further scrutiny. 
Moreover, the agents respond positively to higher fixed wages by exerting more effort – 
contradicting both the standard theory, and the experimental findings. This result, however, is 
consistent with previous studies on labor contracts in which agents hold social and reciprocal 
preferences. Indeed, such a positive relationship between the fixed wage and effort is observed 
in the existing experimental studies on gift exchange (Fehr et al., 1998; Falk et al., 1999; Fehr 
and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2004, 2007).  
Hence, our experiment supports the comparative statics but not the point estimates 
predicted by the theory. However, this is not uncommon in ‘theory-testing’ experiments, where 
the micro-foundation of behavior is reflected through treatment effects, but possible noises 
(e.g., mistakes, preferences) distributed symmetrically across treatments make deviations from 
the point estimates (Anderhub et al 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2004; Hoppe and Schmitz, 2015). 
Adding to the (thin) existing literature, we introduced a treatment in which both the 
principal and the agent faced risk. We find that the results from this treatment are not different 
from the treatment in which only the agent faces risk, and the principal is insured. This result 
will allow future studies to abstract away from the issues relating to the principal being risk 
averse, and to use simplified design while focusing on their specific research questions. 
However, we also observe that the majority of the offers in the No Risk treatment were 
with a suboptimal piece rate, which is in stark difference with the existing studies. A potential 
explanation for such lower offers may be due to our implementation of a minimum wage, which 
may have acted as a reference point for the employers driving downwards the offers of the 
principals. However, since minimum wage is a real life phenomenon, this is an important 
observation as well as an interesting avenue for future research.  
In conclusion, we test the predictions of the IIP in a laboratory setting in which we 
employ a stated effort task, check the robustness of insuring the principal or not, and introduce 
the concept of social projection. We find support for the negative relationship between risk and 
incentives and our results are broadly in line with the existing experimental literature. However, 
we also find some significant and interesting differences with the existing studies that reiterates 
the importance of laboratory experiments in testing and extending theory. Our study can be 
extended in various ways. An interesting extension, for example, would be to allow the subjects 
to form reputation in a repeated setting, therefore more accurately reflecting the real world.  
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 Table 4: Panel regressions on piece rate (β) with random effects at subject level and error clustering at session level  
Dep Var:  Piece Rate Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 
R -1.642** -1.531** -2.267*** -1.669**  -1.526**  -1.129*  -1.715**  
 (0.72) (0.69) (0.70) (0.75)    (0.74)    (0.65)    (0.69)    
BR -1.601 -1.121 -1.601 -0.345    -0.081 -2.431    -0.367   
 (0.69) (0.76) (0.64) (0.75)    (0.68)    (0.70)    (0.75)    
Fixed Wage -0.056**** -0.056**** -0.054**** -0.054**** -0.056**** -0.053**** -0.054**** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    
Suggested Effort 1.162**** 1.199**** 1.080**** 1.078**** 1.162**** 1.077**** 1.072**** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21)    (0.22)    (0.21)    (0.21)    
Holt and Laury (c)  -0.161   -0.337**   
  (0.16)   (0.17)   
Risk Taking (c)   0.039**                  0.049**  
   (0.01)                  (0.05)  
Risk Perception (c)    -0.025**      -0.030** 
    (0.01)      (0.01) 
R x Holt and Laury     0.570*      
     (0.31)      
R x Risk Taking      -0.045*     
      (0.09)     
R x Risk Perception       0.024    
       (0.10)    
British 1.392* 1.338* 1.065 1.458* 1.255* 1.046 1.508* 
 (0.78)    (0.76)    (0.79)    (0.79)    (0.75)    (0.80)    (0.84)    
Gender -0.182 -0.147 -0.351 -0.263 -0.132 -0.312 -0.300 
 (0.64)    (0.64)    (0.62)    (0.62)    (0.64)    (0.66)    (0.60)    
Economics Students -1.149 -1.145 -0.901 -1.171 -1.008 -0.969 -1.155 
 (1.47) (1.38) (1.44) (1.48) (1.38) (1.40) (1.50) 
Constant 8.867**** 8.821**** 6.064**** 12.834**** 8.791**** 5.180**** 13.594**** 
 (1.97) (1.86) (1.59) (2.98) (1.88) (1.87) (3.27) 
Obs 1223 1223 1181 1181 1223 1181 1181 
R2 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 
Prob > Χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001, standard errors are in parentheses. In regressions where the Risk Taking and Risk Perception measures 
are employed (Reg. 3, 4,6, and 7) there are 42 less observations as in one of the sessions these variables were not recorded. HLMs yield similar results.  
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Table 5: Panel regressions on effort (e) with random effects at subject level and error clustering at session level 
Dep Var:  Effort Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 
R 0.103 0.111 0.123 0.104 0.121 -0.129 0.105 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) 
BR  -0.129  -0.118   -0.106 -0.124  -0.111 -0.105 -0.124 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
Fixed Wage 0.008**** 0.009**** 0.009**** 0.009**** 0.009**** 0.009**** 0.009**** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Piece Rate 0.258**** 0.258**** 0.256**** 0.257**** 0.258**** 0.257**** 0.256**** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Suggested Effort 0.044 0.045 -0.05 -0.047 -0.044 -0.046 0.047 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Holt and Laury (c)  -0.009   -0.003   
  (0.03)   (0.04)   
Risk Taking (c)   -0.001                  -0.002  
   (0.01)                  (0.02)  
Risk Perception (c)    -0.001   -0.001 
    (0.01)      (0.01) 
R x Holt and Laury     -0.017   
     (0.03)   
R x Risk Taking      0.006     
      (0.03)     
R x Risk Perception       -0.001    
       (0.03)    
British 0.152 0.148 0.135 0.133 0.151 0.158 0.133 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) 
Gender 0.201 0.204 0.218 0.212 0.204 0.197 0.213 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) 
Economics Students -0.521* -0.512* -0.516** -0.533** -0.509* -0.519** -0.529** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.26) (0.30) 
Constant 2.131**** 2.121**** 2.099**** 2.116**** 2.109**** 2.072**** 2.115**** 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.36) 
Obs 1223 1223 1181 1181 1223 1181 1181 
R2 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 
Prob >  Χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001, standard errors are in parentheses. In regressions where the Risk Taking and Risk Perception measures are 
employed (Reg. 3, 4,6, and 7) there are 42 less observations as in one of the sessions these variables were not recorded. HLMs lead to similar results.  
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Appendix A – The P-A and Theoretical Predictions 
The Parameters of Experimental Implementation 
There are two individuals: a principal 𝑃 and an agent 𝐴. The principal wants to hire the Agent 
to exert effort 𝑒. For every unit of effort exerted by the agent the principal earns 50 ECU.  
However, effort is costly for the agent and the cost function is given by 𝐶(𝑒). The principal 
uses a linear incentive scheme to hire the agent.  
Case with No Risk  
When there is no risk, and effort is observable, then the principal’s profit function is defined as: 
 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅(𝑒) − [𝐹 + 𝛽𝑒]                                                                                                              (1) 
The agent’s payoff when there is no risk is defined as: 
𝑃𝐴 = 𝐹 + 𝛽𝑒 − 𝐶(𝑒)                                                                                                                   (2) 
The Total Revenue is given by: 
𝑅(𝑒) = 50𝑒                                                                                                                                 (3) 
The cost of effort is a strictly increasing and convex function in effort: 
𝐶(𝑒) = 𝑒2                                                                                                                                   (4) 
With: 
𝐹 ... Unconditional fixed wage where 𝐹 ∈ {50, 51, … , 199, 200} 
𝛽 ... The piece rate paid to the agent for each unit of effort, where 𝛽 ∈
{5, 6, … , 39, 40} 
𝑒 ... Effort level revealed by the agent, where 𝑒 ∈ {5, 6, … , 9, 10} 
Given the above parameters the participation constraint, i.e., the constraint that has to be met in 
order to make any contract offer monetarily beneficial for the agent is: 
𝐹 + 𝛽𝑒 ≥ 𝐶(𝑒)                                                                                                                            (5) 
Any offer that does not satisfy (5) if accepted would imply the agent would make losses. 
The principal offers a tuple {𝐹, 𝛽} and wants to: 
max (𝑅(𝑒) − 𝐹 − 𝛽𝑒) 
 21 
 
Given that the agent would accept any contract that satisfies (5) the minimum amount that has 
to be transferred to the agent has to be equal to 𝐶(𝑒). Hence, 
𝐹 + 𝛽𝑒 = 𝐶(𝑒)  
The principal’s maximization problem becomes 
max (𝑅(𝑒) − 𝐶(𝑒))                                                                                                                 (6) 
Inserting the actual parameters and functional forms used in the experiment, this results in 
max (50𝑒 − 𝑒2)   
Maximizing by 𝑒 results in: 𝑒 = 25 
Thus the optimal effort level for the principal would be 25. As the experimental parameters 
only allow 𝑒 ∈ {5, 6, … , 9, 10}, the problem in (6) has a corner solution11 of 𝑒∗ = 10.  
Maximizing the agent’s payoff in (2) with respect to 𝑒∗ leads to  
β − 2e∗ = 0 ⇒ β =  2e∗. 
Inserting the above calculated effort level 𝑒∗ = 10 and solving for 𝛽, finally provides the 
minimum piece rate 𝛽∗. Thus, 
β
∗ = 20                                                                                                (7) 
Thus, the incentive contract is incentive compatible for any value of  β ≥ 20. 
With β = β∗, the consequent profits (after taking into account their endowments) for the 
principal 𝑃𝑃 = 450 and 𝑃𝐴 = 350 for the agent.  
Case with Risk  
When there is risk in the environment the principal is assumed to be able to observe the final 
output (i.e., Total Revenue) but s/he is unable to observe what part of this output is due to the 
agent’s effort and what is due to randomness.  In this case the total revenue function can be 
expressed the following way: 
𝑅(𝑒) = 50(𝑒 + 𝑥)                                                                                                                      (8) 
                                                     
11 The choice for a corner solution was made to reduce complexity to an already highly complex design from the 
perspective of the principal. This choice though bears the cost that will be harder to test if the principals had 
correctly identified that 𝑒∗ is the optimum effort level or if they chose it ad hoc simply following a rule of thumb 
such as the more the better. Nevertheless, the use of corner solutions has often been a common approach to 
experiments which investigated contract design and social preferences. 
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With: 
𝑥 ... Stochastic random factor, where 𝑥 ~ 𝑁 (0, 2.5) 
Assuming the principal to be risk neutral s/he will maximize the expected payoff: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑃) = 𝑅(𝑒) − (𝐹 + 𝛽(𝑒 + 𝑥))                                                                                          (9) 
Given the principal is risk neutral and 𝑥 ~ 𝑁 (0,2.5), the payoff function of the principal can 
be re-written as: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑃) = 50𝑒 − (𝐹 + 𝛽𝑒)                                                                                                         (10) 
However, given the agent is risk averse his or her expected payoff is given by: 
𝐸(𝑃𝐴) = 𝐹 + 𝛽𝑒 − 𝐶(𝑒) −
1
2
𝑟𝛽2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥)                                                                                (11) 
Where: 𝑟 = coefficient of absolute risk aversion of the agent. 
Given the payoff functions (10) and (11), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown that the 
optimal incentive intensity β is given by: 𝛽 =
𝑅′(𝑒)
1+𝑟𝑉𝐶′′(𝑒)
,  where: 𝑉 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥). 
Proof: The agent will choose 𝑒 to maximize his / her expected profit 𝐸(𝑃𝐴). 
F.O.C. 
𝛽 = 𝐶′(𝑒) (Incentive Compatibility Constraint)                                                                    (12) 
Given that the agent’s reservation utility is assumed to be 200 ECU, the principal needs to 
satisfy the following participation constraint: 
𝐹 + 𝛽𝑒 ≥ 𝐶(𝑒) +
1
2
𝑟𝛽𝑉 + 200                                                                                                       (13) 
In equilibrium, this will be strict equality. Principal’s net profit is given by: 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅(𝑒) − (𝐹 + 𝛽𝑒) , substituting equation (13) leads to 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅(𝑒) −  𝐶(𝑒) −
1
2
𝑟𝛽𝑉, substituting equation (12) for β,  
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅(𝑒) −  𝐶(𝑒) −
1
2
𝑟𝐶′(𝑒)2𝑉   
F.O.C. 
𝜕𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝑒
= 𝑅′(𝑒) −  𝐶′(𝑒) − 𝑟𝑉𝐶′(𝑒)𝐶′′(𝑒) = 0  ⇒   
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𝑅′(𝑒) = 𝐶′(𝑒) + 𝑟𝑉𝐶′(𝑒)𝐶′′(𝑒)  ⇒   
𝑅′(𝑒) = 𝐶′(𝑒)[1 + 𝑟𝑉𝐶′(𝑒)] , substituting 𝛽 for 𝐶’(𝑒) 
𝑅′(𝑒) = 𝛽[1 + 𝑟𝑉𝐶′(𝑒)] and solving for 𝛽 
𝛽 =
𝑅′(𝑒)
1+𝑟𝑉𝐶′′(𝑒)
                                                                                                                        (14) 
Given that 𝑉 in our experiment was set at 2.5 and the rest of the factors remained unchanged 
the optimal 𝛽∗ is given by:  
𝛽∗ =
50
1+5𝑟
.           (15) 
We elicited the coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion for all subjects by using the Holt 
and Laury (2002) questionnaire. In order to generate a benchmark for our analysis we calculated 
an average ?̅? from all subjects in our experiment. The average coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion from all subjects who participated in our experiment was  ?̅? = 0.549. After inserting 
?̅? in equation (1) it yields the optimal 𝛽∗ = 13.35. Given 𝛽∗ the optimal effort level 𝑒  for the 
employee is 7. However, as the participants in our subject pool could select only one decimal, 
the second best choice of 𝛽∗  is 13.4. Consequently the expected profits (including endowments) 
for the principal and the agent respectively are: 𝑃𝑃 = 516 and  𝑃𝐴 = 384. 
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Appendix B - Instructions 
 
Welcome to our experiment! You are participating in an experiment on decision making. The 
experiment is expected to last no more than 1 hour and 15 minutes. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other 
participants. If you face any questions at any moment, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come to your desk. 
In the experiment you will be using an experimental currency called ECU. In the end of the 
experiment the ECU you have earned during the experiment will be converted at the exchange 
rate of: 1ECU = £0.02.   
For example, 10ECU=£0.20, 100ECU=£2, 50ECU= £1, 200ECU= £4. 
 
Experiment Overview 
The experiment consists of two parts. The first part is explained in detail bellow the second 
consists of two questionnaires and will be explained at the end of the first part.  
The first part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. The first 3 rounds are practice rounds, 
this means that your choices will not affect your earnings. Their role is to help you understand 
and familiarise with the tasks involved. One from the following 7 rounds will be chosen 
randomly by the computer and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
Each participant is assigned randomly the role of either the employer or the employee. You 
hold this role throughout the experiment. If you are an employer the computer will randomly 
match you with an employee at the start of every round and if you are an employee with an 
employer. The experiment is anonymous; this means that you will not know with whom of the 
other participants you are interacting.  
 
The Structure of a Round 
1) The employer has to offer an employment contract to the employee requesting him/her 
to exert a level of effort.  
 
2) The employee decides to accept or reject the contract: 
 
a.  If he/she rejects the contract the round finishes and both earn 200 ECU. 
b.  If the employee accepts the contract both receive the 200 ECU and he/she 
decides what effort level he/she wants to exert.  
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3) After the employee has chosen an effort level the computer calculates the profits of both 
and the round finishes.  
 
The Contract 
If you are an employer you need to decide what effort level you want the employee to exert. 
After you decide the effort you would want the employee to exert you need to think what 
contract to offer to the employee given the implications that this has in earnings. If you are the 
employee what you need to think is what effort you would want to exert for the given contract 
taking into account the effect this has on earnings. 
At the start of every round both employer and employee receive 200 ECU. This money is for 
you to use within the experiment and are added to your profits for the round.  
Effort in this experiment is represented by a number the employee chooses which ranges from 
5 to 10. Every unit of effort costs ECU to the employee. Table 1 shows the corresponding 
employer revenue and cost of effort for each unit of effort.  
The revenue of the employer is determined by the following: 
Revenue of the employer: 50 x effort. 
That means that for every unit of effort the employee exerts the employer earns 50 ECU. For 
example, if the employee exerts an effort of 3 the employer earns 150 ECU. 
 
 
Effort Cost of effort Employer Revenue 
5 25 250 
6 36 300 
7 49 350 
8 64 400 
9 81 450 
10 100 500 
 
Table 1: Effort levels, Cost of Effort, and Employer Revenue 
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Employers can choose to pay the employee with a fixed wage and/or with a piece rate. 
A fixed wage is a transfer of money from the employer to the employee which is independent 
of how much effort he/she exerts (for example, a salary). The fixed wage can range from 50 
to 200 ECU. 
A piece rate is a payment for every unit of effort. An example of that could be an apple picker. 
If the employee was an apple picker a piece rate would mean a specific amount of money (ECU) 
for every basket of apples (effort) he brings to the employer. For example for a piece rate of 20, 
and an effort level of 5 the employee will be paid 20x5= 100 ECU i.e. the employee earns 100 
ECU. (The piece rate can range from 5 to 40 including one decimal (i.e. 10.1, 23.4, 30.5 etc.). 
Suggested effort 
In his/her contract offer the employer has to suggest an effort level to the employee. Note 
however that the suggested effort of the employer is only a suggestion. The employee is not 
bound to that suggestion but he/she is free to choose any effort level within the given range of 
5 to 10.        
 
The Minimum Contract 
The minimum effort of the employee is 5. To ensure that the employee is at least compensated 
for his/her minimum effort the contract offered by the employer must have a minimum fixed 
wage of 50 ECU and a piece rate of 5.  
 
How Earnings from a Round are calculated 
For the employer his/her earnings are the 200 ECU he received at the start of the round, plus 
the revenue generated by the employee’s effort, minus the fixed wage he/she paid and minus 
the piece rate he/she paid. In other words: 
Employer’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece Rate x Effort 
In the case of the employee, his/her earnings are his/her 200 ECU plus the fixed wage plus the 
piece rate times the effort, minus the cost of effort. In other words:  
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x Effort – Cost of Effort 
 
Overview 
0. The employer chooses the fixed wage (from 50 to 200), the piece rate (5 to 40) and 
suggests an effort level (from 5 to 10) to the employee.  
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1. Afterwards, the employee has been informed of the offered contract, he/she has to 
decide either to accept or reject the contract. If the employee rejects the contract the 
stage finishes. If he accepts the contract, he receives the offered fixed wage and decides 
an effort level (from 5 to 10).  
 
2. Once the employee has decided an effort level, the computer calculates the earnings 
of the employer and the employee and informs both participants.  
 
3. This procedure is repeated till we reach round 10. 
. 
Some Examples 
Think the following examples carefully and try to see if the earnings have been calculated 
correctly. The numbers chosen are purely illustrative. 
 
Example 1: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200  Effort 10 
Piece Rate 5    
Suggested Effort 10   
     
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
450 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
350 
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Example 2: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  250  Effort 5 
Piece Rate 10    
Suggested Effort 10   
     
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
150 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
475 
 
 
 Example 3: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50  Effort 10 
Piece Rate 20    
Suggested Effort 10   
     
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
450 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
350 
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Example 4: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50  Effort 10 
Piece Rate 30    
Suggested Effort 8   
     
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
350 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
450 
 
 
Example 5: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50  Effort 5 
Piece Rate 24.7    
Suggested Effort 5   
     
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
403 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
397 
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Instructions (R Treatment) 
 
Welcome to our experiment! You are participating in an experiment on decision making. The 
experiment is expected to last no more than 1 hour and 15 minutes. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other 
participants. If you face any questions at any moment please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come to your desk. 
In the experiment you will be using an experimental currency called ECU. In the end of the 
experiment the ECU you have earned during the experiment will be converted at the exchange 
rate of: 1ECU = £0.02.   
For example, 10ECU=£0.20, 100ECU=£2, 50ECU= £1, 200ECU= £4. 
 
Experiment Overview 
The experiment consists of two parts. The first part is explained in detail bellow the second 
consists of two questionnaires and will be explained at the end of the first part.  
The first part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. The first 3 rounds are practice rounds, 
this means that your choices will not affect your earnings. Their role is to help you understand 
and familiarise with the tasks involved. One from the following 7 rounds will be chosen 
randomly by the computer and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
Each participant is assigned randomly the role of either the employer or the employee. You 
hold this role throughout the experiment. If you are an employer the computer will randomly 
match you with an employee at the start of every round and if you are an employee with an 
employer. The experiment is anonymous; this means that you will not know with whom of the 
other participants you are interacting.  
 
The Structure of a Round 
1) The employer has to offer an employment contract to the employee requesting 
him/her to exert a level of effort.  
 
2) The employee decides to accept or reject the contract: 
 
a.  If he/she rejects the contract the round finishes and both earn 200 ECU. 
b.  If the employee accepts the contract both receive the 200 ECU and he/she 
decides what effort level he/she wants to exert.  
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3) After the employee has chosen an effort level the computer calculates the profits of 
both and the round finishes.  
 
The Contract 
If you are an employer you need to decide what effort level you want the employee to exert. 
After you decide the effort you would want the employee to exert you need to think what 
contract to offer to the employee given the implications that this has in earnings. If you are the 
employee what you need to think is what effort you would want to exert for the given contract 
taking into account the effect this has on earnings. 
At the start of every round both employer and employee receive 200 ECU. This money is for 
you to use within the experiment and are added to your profits for the round.  
Effort in this experiment is represented by a number the employee chooses, which ranges from 
5 to 10. Every unit of effort costs ECU to the employee. Table 1 shows the corresponding 
employer revenue and cost of effort for each unit of effort.  
The revenue of the employer is determined by the following: 
Revenue of the employer: 50 x effort. 
That means that for every unit of effort the employee exerts the employer earns 50 ECU. For 
example, if the employee exerts an effort of 3 the employer earns 150 ECU. 
 
 
Effort Cost of effort Employer Revenue 
5 25 250 
6 36 300 
7 49 350 
8 64 400 
9 81 450 
10 100 500 
 
 
Table 1: Effort levels, Cost of Effort, and Employer Revenue 
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Employers can choose to pay the employee with a fixed wage and/or with a piece rate. 
A fixed wage is a transfer of money from the employer to the employee, which is independent 
of how much effort he/she exerts (for example, a salary). The fixed wage can range from 0 to 
200 ECU. 
A piece rate is a payment for every unit of output. Output is the sum of effort + a luck 
value. An example of that could be an apple picker. If the employee was an apple picker a piece 
rate would mean a specific amount of money (ECU) for every basket of apples (output) s/he 
brings to the employer. And the luck factor could be how favourable or unfavourable the 
weather conditions has been. The piece rate can range from 5 to 40. For example, for a piece 
rate of 10, an effort level of 3, and a luck value of 2, it means the employee will be paid 
10x(3+2)= 50 i.e., the employee earns 50 ECU. 
Table 2 show the values luck may take (that is from -5 to 5) and what is the chance for each of 
these values to be selected by the computer. For example, the chance the luck value to turn out 
to be -5 is one out of a hundred, for  -1 is sixteen out of a hundred, for 2 is twelve out of a 
hundred etc. 
 
 
Luck Chance 
-5 1% 
-4 4% 
-3 7% 
-2 12% 
-1 16% 
0 20% 
1 16% 
2 12% 
3 7% 
4 4% 
5 1% 
 
 
Table 2: Chance of each luck factor to happen 
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The earnings for the employee from the piece rate are calculated by the ECU value chosen from 
the employer (from 5 to 40) multiplied by the output, which is the sum of the effort and luck 
(i.e., piece rate x (effort + luck)). Note that luck  only affects the earnings of the employee. 
 
 
An example (numbers are purely illustrative) 
 
Assume: a) the employer chooses to set the piece rate at the value of 5, b) the employee chooses 
an effort of 5 and the luck value turns out to be -2.  
 
The employee’s from the piece rate are the piece rate times the sum of effort and luck (i.e., 5 x 
(5+(-2))= 5 x 3 = 15), which is 15 ECU plus the 100 ECU minus the cost of effort for 5 units of 
effort, which is 28. Therefore, the employee will earn 115 – 28, which is 87 ECU.  
 
For the employer however the earnings are calculated without considering the luck value. 
Therefore, the employer will receive 25 x 5 (the revenue from 5 units of effort) minus the piece 
rate, which will be 5 (the piece rate) times the effort of the employee, which was 5 plus the 100 
ECU that is given to him at the start of the round. Hence 125 – 25 + 100 leading to earnings of 
100 ECU. 
Suggested effort 
In his/her contract offer the employer has to suggest an effort level to the employee. Note 
however that the suggested effort of the employer is only a suggestion. The employee is not 
bound to that suggestion but he/she is free to choose any effort level within the given range of 
0 to 5.        
 
The Minimum Contract 
The minimum effort of the employee is 5. To ensure that the employee is at least compensated 
for his/her minimum effort the contract offered by the employer must have a minimum fixed 
wage of 50 ECU and a piece rate of 5.  
 
How Earnings from a Round are calculated 
For the employer his/her earnings are the 200 ECU s/he received at the start of the round, plus 
the revenue generated by the employee’s effort, minus the fixed wage he/she paid and minus 
the piece rate he/she paid. In other words: 
Employer’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – Piece Rate x Effort 
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In the case of the employee, his/her earnings are his/her 100 ECU plus the fixed wage plus the 
piece rate times the sum of effort and the luck factor, minus the cost of effort. In other words:  
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x (Effort+ luck) – Cost of Effort 
 
Note that the luck factor affects only the employee! 
 
Overview 
1. The employer chooses the fixed wage (from 50 to 200), the piece rate (5 to 40) and 
suggests an effort level (from 5 to 10) to the employee.  
2. Afterwards, the employee has been informed of the offered contract, he/she has to 
decide either to accept or reject the contract. If the employee rejects the contract the 
stage finishes. If s/he accepts the contract, s/he receives the offered fixed wage and 
decides an effort level (from 5 to 10).  
3. Once the employee has decided an effort level, the computer calculates the earnings 
of the employer and the employee and informs both participants.  
4. This procedure is repeated till we reach round 10. 
. 
Some Examples 
Think of the following examples carefully and try to see if the earnings have been calculated 
correctly. The numbers chosen are purely illustrative. 
 
Example 1: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200  Effort 10 
Piece Rate 5    
Suggested Effort 10  Computer Choices 
   Luck 0 
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
450 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
350 
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Example 2: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200  Effort 5 
Piece Rate 10    
Suggested Effort 10  Computer Choices 
   Luck -2 
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
200 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
405 
 
 
 
 Example 3: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50  Effort 10 
Piece Rate 20    
Suggested Effort 10  Computer Choices 
   Luck +2 
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
450 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
390 
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Example 4: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50  Effort 10 
Piece Rate 30    
Suggested Effort 8  Computer Choices 
   Luck -5 
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
350 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
300 
 
 
Example 5: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50  Effort 5 
Piece Rate 24.7    
Suggested Effort 5  Computer Choices 
   Luck +5 
     
Employer Earnings = 200 ECU + Revenue – Fixed Wage – 
Piece Rate x Effort 
277 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
Effort  – Cost of Effort 
472 
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Instructions (BR Treatment) 
 
Welcome to our experiment! You are participating in an experiment on decision making. The 
experiment is expected to last no more than 1 hour and 15 minutes. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other 
participants. If you face any questions at any moment please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come to your desk. 
In the experiment you will be using an experimental currency called ECU. In the end of the 
experiment the ECU you have earned during the experiment will be converted at the exchange 
rate of: 1ECU = £0.02.   
For example, 10ECU=£0.20, 100ECU=£2, 50ECU= £1, 200ECU= £4. 
 
Experiment Overview 
The experiment consists of two parts. The first part is explained in detail bellow the second 
consists of two questionnaires and will be explained at the end of the first part.  
The first part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. The first 3 rounds are practice rounds, 
this means that your choices will not affect your earnings. Their role is to help you understand 
and familiarise with the tasks involved. One from the following 7 rounds will be chosen 
randomly by the computer and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
Each participant is assigned randomly the role of either the employer or the employee. You 
hold this role throughout the experiment. If you are an employer the computer will randomly 
match you with an employee at the start of every round and if you are an employee with an 
employer. The experiment is anonymous; this means that you will not know with whom of the 
other participants you are interacting.  
 
The Structure of a Round 
1) The employer has to offer an employment contract to the employee requesting 
him/her to exert a level of effort.  
 
2) The employee decides to accept or reject the contract: 
a.  If he/she rejects the contract the round finishes and both earn 200 ECU. 
b.  If the employee accepts the contract both receive the 200 ECU and 
he/she decides what effort level he/she wants to exert.  
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3) After the employee has chosen an effort level the computer calculates the profits 
of both and the round finishes.  
 
The Contract 
If you are an employer you need to decide what effort level you want the employee to exert. 
After you decide the effort you would want the employee to exert you need to think what 
contract to offer to the employee given the implications that this has in earnings. If you are the 
employee what you need to think is what effort you would want to exert for the given contract 
taking into account the effect this has on earnings. 
At the start of every round both employer and employee receive 200 ECU. This money is for 
you to use within the experiment and are added to your profits for the round.  
Effort in this experiment is represented by a number the employee chooses, which ranges from 
5 to 10. Every unit of effort costs ECU to the employee. Table 1 shows the corresponding 
employer revenue and cost of effort for each unit of effort.  
The revenue of the employer is determined by the following: 
Revenue of the employer: 50 x (Effort + Luck). 
Luck is a number that is randomly chosen by the computer and can range from -5 to 5.  
That means that for every unit of effort (assume luck is 0) the employee decides, the employer 
earns 50 ECU. For example, if the employee decides an effort of 3 the employer earns 150 
ECU. 
 
 
Effort Cost of effort Employer Revenue 
5 25 250 
6 36 300 
7 49 350 
8 64 400 
9 81 450 
10 100 500 
 
Table 1: Effort levels, Cost of Effort, and Employer Revenue 
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Employers can choose to pay the employee with a fixed wage and/or with a piece rate. 
A fixed wage is a transfer of money from the employer to the employee, which is independent 
of how much effort he/she exerts (for example, a salary). The fixed wage can range from 50 
to 200 ECU. 
A piece rate is a payment for every unit of output. Output is the sum of effort and the luck 
value. An example of that could be an apple picker. If the employee was an apple picker a piece 
rate would mean a specific amount of money (ECU) for every basket of apples (output) s/he 
brings to the employer. And the luck factor could be how favourable or unfavourable the 
weather conditions have been. The piece rate can range from 5 to 40. For example, for a piece 
rate of 10, an effort level of 5, and a luck value of 2, it means the employee will be paid 
10x(5+2)= 70 i.e., the employee earns 70 ECU. 
Table 2 show the values luck may take (that is from -5 to 5) and what is the chance for each of 
these values to be selected by the computer. For example, the chance the luck value to turn out 
to be -5 is one out of a hundred, for -1 is sixteen out of a hundred, for 2 is twelve out of a 
hundred etc. 
 
 
 
Luck Chance 
-5 1% 
-4 4% 
-3 7% 
-2 12% 
-1 16% 
0 20% 
1 16% 
2 12% 
3 7% 
4 4% 
5 1% 
 
Table 2: Chance of each luck factor to happen 
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The earnings for the employee from the piece rate are calculated by the ECU value chosen from 
the employer (from 5 to 40) multiplied by the output, which is the sum of the effort and luck 
(i.e., piece rate x (effort + luck)).  
 
An example (numbers are purely illustrative) 
 
Assume: a) the employer chooses to set the piece rate at the value of 5, b) the employee chooses 
an effort of 5 and the luck value turns out to be -2.  
 
The employee’s earnings from the piece rate are the piece rate times the sum of effort and luck 
(i.e., 5 x (5+(-2))= 5 x 3 = 15), which is 15 ECU plus the 200 ECU minus the cost of effort for 
5 units of effort, which is 28. So, the employee will earn 215 – 28, which is 187 ECU.  
 
The employer will receive 50 x (5-2), which equals to 150 ECU, minus the piece rate, which 
will be 15 plus the 200 ECU that is given to him at the start of the round. Hence 150 – 15 + 200 
leading to earnings of 3250 ECU. 
 
Suggested effort 
In his/her contract offer the employer has to suggest an effort level to the employee. Note 
however that the suggested effort of the employer is only a suggestion. The employee is not 
bound to that suggestion but he/she is free to choose any effort level within the given range of 
5 to 10.        
 
The Minimum Contract 
The minimum effort of the employee is 5. To ensure that the employee is compensated for 
his/her minimum effort the contract offered by the employer must have a minimum fixed wage 
of 50 ECU and a piece rate of 5. This way it is ensured that neither the employers nor the 
employees can make losses. 
 
How Earnings from a Round are calculated 
For the employer his/her earnings are the 200 ECU s/he received at the start of the round, plus 
the revenue generated by the sum of the employee’s effort and the luck factor, minus the fixed 
wage he/she paid and minus the piece rate he/she paid. In other words: 
Employer’s Earnings = 200 ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed Wage – Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck) 
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For the employee, his/her earnings are his/her 200 ECU plus the fixed wage plus the piece rate 
times the sum of effort and the luck factor, minus the cost of effort. In other words:  
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x (Effort+ luck) – Cost of Effort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
1. The employer chooses the fixed wage (from 50 to 200), the piece rate (5 to 40) and 
suggests an effort level (from 5 to 10) to the employee.  
2. Afterwards, the employee has been informed of the offered contract, he/she has to 
decide either to accept or reject the contract. If the employee rejects the contract the 
stage finishes. If s/he accepts the contract, s/he receives the offered fixed wage and 
decides an effort level (from 5 to 10).  
3. Once the employee has decided an effort level, the computer calculates the earnings 
of the employer and the employee and informs both participants.  
4. This procedure is repeated till we reach round 10. 
. 
Some Examples 
Think of the following examples carefully and try to see if the earnings have been calculated 
correctly. The numbers chosen are purely illustrative. 
 
 
Example 1: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200  Effort 10 
Piece Rate 5    
Suggested Effort 10  Computer Choices 
   Luck 0 
     
Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed 
Wage – Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
450 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
350 
 
 42 
 
Example 2: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  200  Effort 5 
Piece Rate 10    
Suggested Effort 10  Computer Choices 
   Luck -2 
     
Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed 
Wage – Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
120 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
405 
 
 
  
Example 3: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50  Effort 10 
Piece Rate 20    
Suggested Effort 10  Computer Choices 
   Luck +2 
     
Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed 
Wage – Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
510 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
390 
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Example 4: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50  Effort 10 
Piece Rate 30    
Suggested Effort 8  Computer Choices 
   Luck -5 
     
Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed 
Wage – Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
250 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
300 
 
 
Example 5: 
 
Employer Choices  Employee Choice 
Fixed Wage  50  Effort 5 
Piece Rate 24.7    
Suggested Effort 5  Computer Choices 
   Luck +5 
     
Employer’s Earnings = 200ECU + 50x(Effort+Luck) – Fixed 
Wage – Piece Rate x (Effort+Luck) 
403 
Employee’s Earnings = 200 ECU + Fixed Wage + Piece Rate x 
(Effort+Luck)  – Cost of Effort 
472 
 
 
 
